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A MODEL FOR THE INTERVENTION OF A
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Janice M. Barrow, Kennesaw State University
ABSTRACT
This paper builds a model for intervention and/or mitigation of a financial crisis by first identifying those
conditions precedent to a systemic based financial crisis, and then outlying a process to integrate firm
specific and systematic risk into a comprehensive strategic model. A simple application of the model was
able to identify significant outliers. For example, using 2006 to 2010 data, Capital One Financial
Corporation was identified for intervention from as early as 2006. This corporation received $3.56
billion of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Federal bailout funds.
JEL: G01 - Financial Crises, G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
KEYWORDS: Systematic risk, financial crisis, banking, reform, failure, regulation, capital,
interconnectedness, macro-prudential, micro-prudential
INTRODUCTION

I

n hindsight, regulators and analysts, alike, have been able to identify several factors that led to the
Financial Crisis that began in 2007 (Poole, 2010b). The causes presented include factors such as:
inadequate regulation; duration mismatch; federal subsidy of housing; federal subsidy of debt
financing; moral hazard; interconnectedness of institutions; and unmanaged systematic risk (Lal, 2010;
Poole, 2010a; Poole, 2010b; Scott 2010; Leondis, 2010; Ennis and Keister, 2010). Unfortunately,
historically, bank regulations tend to be passed in response to various crises rather than to prevent them
from occurring although there is no doubt that financial institutions play an integral role in the functioning
of the economy and should be given priority (Barth et al. 2010; Holowecky et al. 2010). Therefore, going
forward, the important question that needs to be answered is: In foresight, how can we prevent or mitigate
future financial crises, and what regulation is required?
The remainder of the paper attempts to answer that question. The next section is a continuation of the
review of the literature introduced here in the introduction. The literature review focuses on identifying
conditions precedent to a financial crisis, and then on building a model to prevent or mitigate future
crises. The following section presents data and analysis of a simple application of the model. The final
section summarizes the paper and makes recommendations for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In reviewing the literature, prevention solution options presented include recommendations to: alter
capital requirements; change clearing houses usage requirements; alter the way insolvent institutions are
resolved; continue emergency lending by the Fed, and restructure the regulatory system All such solutions
have been argued to be burdensome and ineffective to prevent a systematic risk based crisis (Scott, 2010).
In his paper, Scott concentrated on reviewing the literature on the relevant recommendations of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) and The United States Treasury as well as pending
congressional legislation. The CCMR is an independent, nonpartisan research organization founded in
2005 to improve the regulation of United States capital markets. It consists of 30 leaders from the investor
community, business, finance, law, accounting and academia (CCMR, 2011).
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Evidence of the ineffectiveness of the proposed solutions is seen in the failure of Basel II, the
recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision created by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten nations passed in 2004. The Basel
III documents submitted in 2009 attempt to answer the question of “What regulation is required?” and its
provisions include: changes in the definition of capital; revisions to counter party credit capital standards;
new global leverage ratio; explicit capital buffer standards; and new global liquidity standards (Holbrook,
2010). Among other things, these provisions are an attempt to improve the regulation of the financial
system but still leave significant systematic risk exposure which is one of the main factors that helped
cause the crisis in the first place (Boerner, 2010; Holbrook, 2010; Weber, 2010; Triana, 2010). For
example, Berger et al (2008) show that Bank Holding Companies (BHC) had been actively managing
their capital ratios, had set targets substantially above regulatory minima and make rapid adjustments
towards those targets. Even the new regulatory requirements under Basel III would not have been
adequate to prevent the crisis. Triana (2010) further shows that Basel III: permits higher leverage (higher
risk); has flawed risk measures; and restricts opportunities for higher potential returns – increases risks
and lowers returns.
If these solutions presented are indeed ineffective and/or incomplete then the use of early, reliable
indicators to signal trouble and trigger intervention could prove invaluable. The next step then is to
provide valuable information in answering the question of how to prevent or mitigate future financial
crisis by focusing on managing systematic risk and by developing a model that identifies factors that can
signal trouble and trigger intervention.
Conditions Precedent of the Financial Crisis
There have been many factors identified in the cause of the financial crisis that began in 2007 and there is
no clear consensus as to whether regulatory reform would serve to prevent such a crisis from recurring.
However, there is consensus on the following three conditions precedent:
Large losses from lending and securitization: This is macro systematic risk related to over-exposure in an
upswing of a credit cycle and being overly risk averse in a down cycle (Stucke, 2010). Risk build-up in an
expansion is countercyclical (Weber, 2010).
Interconnectedness: This is macro systematic risk related to the failure of one significant institution,
which can cause or contribute to the failure of other significant institutions; and the possibility that one
exogenous shock may cause or contribute to the failure of multiple significant financial institutions (Scott,
2010).
Loss of Confidence: This is macro systematic risk related to the level of financial transactions that are not
regulated and/or protected, the level of uninsured deposits, credit default risk exposure, innovations such
as information technology or information asymmetry (Scott, 2010; Poole, 2010a). Ennis and Keister
(2010) conclude that financial crises have a self-fulfilling component and that the banks’ operating
structure makes them susceptible to runs and so they are innately fragile.
Modeling Considerations
This paper contends that the measures of those conditions precedent can serve to provide early warning
signals of changes in systematic risk and be used in conjunction with regulatory reform to trigger precrisis intervention. Additionally, according to Allen and Saunders (2004) U.S. banking regulators have
contended that 15-20 major banks and 5-10 major securities firms dominate critical financial markets,
therefore as global financial markets consolidate and harmonize the possibility of contagion risk
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increases. However, this smaller list of key players could provide a more narrowly focused
intervention/mitigation strategy.
The hypothesis broadly stated, therefore, is:
Decision to intervene = f (credit countercyclical risk, interconnectedness, loss of confidence)

(1)

Allen and Saunders (2004) define pro-cyclicality as system-wide operational losses triggered by
contagion across linked financial intermediaries. They surveyed the effects of pro-cyclicality on risk
measures and found that, whereas a fundamentally strong institution can often recover from market and
credit risk, it may be impossible for it to recover from certain operational risk events. Therefore, the main
concerns are the low frequency/high severity risk events, which occur quite infrequently, consistent with
the conditions precedent.
Franz (2010) has shown that the stock market has been highly consistent in predicting economic
expansions and contractions. Additionally, Tsai and Chang (2010) have also shown that since
macroeconomic factors are affected by government actions, macroeconomic and firm specific factors
must be dealt with separately. Their model establishes financial factors, market variables and
macroeconomic variables, to successfully predict financial distress.
A review of the literature relating to procyclicality tendencies of banking shows how banking capital
requirements along with monetary policy actually results in the amplification of exogenous shocks. One
key factor affecting the magnitude of the procyclical effect is measured by the composition of the banks’
asset portfolio (Drumond, 2009). This would then be combined with a measure of macroeconomic policy
to estimate the systematic risk associated with procyclical effects.
Measures of interconnectivity relate to size and so identification of those major banks and securities
firms, that dominate the market, is critical.
The factors leading to loss of confidence have to do with the innate fragility of the banking system and
can be measured by the leading indicators such as the movement of the stock market as well as bank
specific risk factors in their operating environment.
Recommended Process
Step 1: Utilize a financial distress prediction model to identify firm specific risks such as a discrete-time
hazard model like the multi-period logit model, which has been used successfully to estimate the
significant parameters in predicting financial distress (Tsai and Chang, 2010, Shumway 2001; Barrow,
1993). The assumed functional form of the logit model is the logistic function:
Pr [Yi=1) = Pi =, (1 /(+ e w i ) ,
Where,
Wi = b0 +

m

∑

bjxij

i = 1...N

(2)
(3)

is the logit transformation and is a linear combination of the independent variables and a set of
coefficients bj = (b1, b2 ,...b m ) that can be estimated. N is the number of observations; x is the value of the
jth variable of the ith observation; and Y sub i is a dependent variable that represents the final outcome: Y
i = 1 for failed institutions, Y i = 0 for non-failures.

43

J. M. Barrow | GJBR ♦ Vol. 6 ♦ No. 2 ♦ 2012

For this application, it is assumed that there is some linear combination of the independent variables that
is positively related to financial distress. If Wj exists, it is an index of that institution's propensity to fail or
become solvent.
Step 2: The parameters from Step 1 can then be used to identify problem financial in conjunction with a
predetermined distress cut-off point.
Step 3: To address the issues of interconnectivity and pro-cyclicality, the next step is to identify the large
financial institutions that have a significant impact on economic activity.
Step 4: Closely monitor those institutions identified in Step 3 for vulnerability.
DATA ANALYSIS
There were two key sources of banking data. The first is from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS),
a web-based business data research service from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
Their Bank Regulatory Database contains five databases for regulated depository financial institutions.
These databases provide accounting data for bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks,
and savings and loans institutions. Their data comes from the required regulatory forms filed for
supervising purposes. The second source of data is from the National Information Center (NIC), a central
repository of data about banks and other institutions for which the Federal Reserve has a supervisory,
regulatory, or research interest, including both domestic and foreign banking organizations operating in
the United States. Their web site provides access to NIC data, allowing the public to search for detailed
information about banking organizations.
The NIC has a Bank Holding Company Peer Groups report that contains a summary of peer group
financial data and a listing of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in each Peer Group. BHCs with assets
over $500 million are classified into one of nine tiers. Tier 1 consists of BHCs with consolidated assets of
$10 Billion and over. Given that only the top 20 or so financial institutions dominate the financial
markets, the top tier 1 banks with consolidated assets of $100 billion were selected for review. Table 1
shows 22 institutions that met the criteria. These are the main institutions to monitor in addressing the
interconnectedness and pro-cyclicality systematic risks considerations and therefore, the key financial
institutions that should play a major role in the financial crisis intervention or mitigation process. Note,
however, that the number is not static.
Fundamental company data was provided by Capital IQ, a business owned by the Standard and Poors
Company and accessible from WRDS. Capital IQ provides market data across all major quoted markets
including equity, mutual funds, fixed income, indices, commodities, currencies, and rates. Equity pricing
data includes close, open, bid, ask, mid, low, best, high price values along with volume, splits, dividends,
ticker, exchange information, short interest data, and VWAP for select markets. Upon retrieving the data
it was discovered that due to various reasons, such as reorganizations (TD Bank Holding Company, U.S.
Bankcorp, Ally Financial Inc. and Citizens Financial Group) or is privately held (Taunu Corporations),
there were only 17 BHCs with complete market price data for analysis.
Following on Franz (2010), it is assumed that the stock market is consistent in anticipating economic
cycles. To confirm this assumption, S&P 500 index monthly data was compared with the adjusted stock
prices for the 17 banks using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r). It ranges from +1 to
-1. A correlation of +1 means that there is a perfect positive linear relationship between variables. Table
2 and Figure 1 show the results for the five-year period reviewed, 2006 to 2010.
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Based on the “Rule of Thumb” shown in Table 3, there was a very strong correlation between the
variables during the period 2006 and 2010, inclusive with no outliers. The period 2006 was chosen to
establish a base correlation before the financial crisis that began in 2007. There was a high correlation
between the variables with an outlier exception of Capital One Financial Corporation that had a
correlation coefficient of -0.471 and was the recipient of $3.56 billion of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act Federal bailout in the form of a preferred stock purchase. (WRDS, 2010). The same
analysis was done on 2010 to have current data. The correlations in 2010 were moderate, on average,
with the outlier exception of Bank of America Corporation, which had a correlation coefficient of 0.0857. It lost $2.24 billion for 2010 as gradual improvements in its core banking business were offset by
charges linked to its disastrous 2008 acquisition of Countrywide Financial (WDRS, 2010). Figure 1
shows the correlation results as well as the magnitude of the outliers, banks number eleven and one,
respectively.
Table 1: BHCs with consolidated assets of $100 Billion and above as of 12/31/2010
Rank

Institution Name

Location

Total Assets 12/31/2010
($’000)

1

Bank of America Corporation

Charlotte, NC

$2,268,347,377

2

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

New York, NY

$2,117,605,000

3

Citigroup Inc.

New York, NY

$1,913,902,000

4

Wells Fargo & Company

San Francisco, CA

$1,258,128,000

5

Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,

New York, NY

$911,330,000

6

Morgan Stanley

New York, NY

$807,698,000

7

MetLife, Inc.

New York, NY

$730,905,863

8

Taunus Corporation

New York, NY

$372,556,000

9

HSBC North America Holdings Inc.

New York, NY

$343,699,907

10

U.S. Bancorp

Minneapolis, MN

$307,786,000

11

PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., The

Pittsburgh, PA

$264,414,112

12

Bank Of New York Mellon Corporation, The

New York, NY

$247,222,000

13

Capital One Financial Corporation

Mclean, VA

$197,503,411

14

Td Bank Us Holding Company

Portland, ME

$176,972,361

15

SunTrust Banks, Inc.

Atlanta, GA

$172,875,298

16

Ally Financial Inc.

Detroit, MI

$172,011,000

17

State Street Corporation

Boston, MA

$158,890,975

18

BB&T Corporation

Winston-Salem, NC

$157,081,396

19

American Express Company

New York, NY

$146,005,718

20

Citizens Financial Group, Inc.

Providence, RI

$129,969,527

21

Regions Financial Corporation

Birmingham, AL

$132,399,290

22

Fifth Third Bancorp

Cincinnati, OH

$111,006,778

This table shows the 22 Tier 1 Bank Holding Companies with assets of $100 billion or more, taken from the list of top 50 BHCs. There were 34
institutions with consolidated assets over $50 billion. Source: http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx
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Table 2: The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for the S&P 500 and Our Top Banks
Period/Variable

Average r
n
for the 17 banks
Monthly statistics 2006-2010
0.836
60
Monthly statistics 2006
0.728
12
Monthly statistics 2010
0.581
12
This table shows the results of the correlation analysis between the S&P 500 indices and the adjusted stock price for the 17 BHCs for the three
time-periods indicated.

Table 3: Rule of Thumb for Interpreting the Size of a Correlation Coefficient
Size of Correlation
Interpretation
0.90 to 1.00 (-0.90 to -1.00)
Very high correlation
0.70 to 0.90 (-0.70 to -0.90)
High correlation
0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70)
Moderate correlation
0.30 to 0.50 (-0.30 to -0.50)
Low correlation
0.00 to 0.30 ( 0.00 to -0.30)
Little if any correlation
Source: Hinkle DE, Wiersma W, Jurs SG. (1998). Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 4th ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company.

Figure 1: Plot of the Correlation Coefficients for the 17 Institutions by Rank
1.2
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This figure 1 shows the correlation coefficient (r) between the monthly S&P 500 indices and the stock price of the top 17 banks using 2006 to
2010 data, 2006 data and 2010 data. The outlier in 2006 was Capital One Financial Corporation and the outlier in 2010 was Bank of America
Corporation.

CONCLUSION
This paper reviewed the literature on the causes of financial crises and many solution ideas, including
those recommended by Basel III submitted in 2009, the Group of Ten’s Basel Committee on Banking
Regulation. The suggestions presented were found to be either ineffective or incomplete. After closely
reviewing the proposals and analyses submitted by regulators and analysts, there seemed to be consensus
on three key systematic risk factors: large losses from lending and securitization; interconnectedness; and
loss of confidence. A four-step process is then presented. Critical to the process is the ability to predict
firm specific risks separate from macroeconomic risks. A simple application of the model using 2006 to
2010 data showed how, for example, Capital One Corporation could and should have been flagged for
intervention from 2006, before anyone had an idea of the crisis to come. In addition, the model has
flagged Bank of America Corporation, using the 2010 data.
The application of the model used only one variable, however the full application of the model could use
several variables in a more complex intervention matrix. Further study and extensions of the findings of
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this paper could integrate the four steps, and using all relevant variables, such as bank specific risk
factors, in a comprehensive strategy for intervention and mitigation of future financial crises.
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